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Question What is the phosphatase of PTEN? What is the casein kinase activator or inhibitor? What is the proteins which bind to PTEN? Answer p53, Casein kinase 2, and so on. PTEN is dephospharylated by insulin-like growth factor and maybe activated. SHIPとの関係は? 総説を読んで。 CSの共同体のCSの判断基準において、mental retardation はminor criteriaに入っている。ということは、それほどCSにおいて、mental retardationは重要なphenotypeではないらしい。これは、ちょっと残念。 結晶構造解析の結果から、C2ドメインとホスファターゼドメインはくっついている。 C2ドメインmutationも同様にCSで見られる。point mutation ではなくてnonsence mutation and deletion mutationである。おそらく、C2ドメインはPSなどにくっつくのではないかと推測されていて、膜に行くことができないために、CSになるのではないかと推測される。 ちなみに、ホスファターゼドメインはアルファへリックス。 C2ドメインはベータシートがメインだね。 PTENのタンパク質の安定性は、S380, 382,383のリン酸化による。 カゼインキナーゼが370, 380, 383, 385をリン酸化する。 366はGSK3bによってリン酸化される。 370, 380, 385はCK2によってリン酸化される。 Some author said that 380, 382, 383 and 385 is phosphorylation site. 383 is dephosphorylated by PTEN itself and regulates migration activity(science 2003). 1. History of PTEN PTEN is the acronym of phosphatase and tensin homologue on chromosome 10. PTEN was cloned from three groups in 1997 as a tumor suppressor for gliomas. rat PTEN homo sapiens PTEN 2. What is PTEN gonna cause? PTEN germline mutations are associated with Cowden disease, Bannayan-Zonana syndrome and Lhermitte Duclos disease which gives disorganized hamartomas in various organs. Cowden syndrome patients exist 1/200,000. Mutation of PTEN is a common event in diverse human cancers, occuring in about 50% of glioblastoma, endometrial, prostate carcinoma.Germline mutations in PTEN are associated with the dominantly inherited Cowden syndromes. Cowden syndrome is firstly described in 1963. CS is qutosomal dominant disorder. It was reported that the gene for this disease is in 10q22-q23 using linkage analysis of 12 families in 1996. Main features are macrocephaly and mental retardation. Approximately 80% of CS patients have PTEN mutations. cowden disease syndrome cowden2 PTEN null mice exhibit embryonic lethality. There are a bunch of conditional PTEN KO mice including astrocyte KO mice using GFAP-Cre and dividing neuronal cells KO mice using Nse-Cre. First paper shows LTP reduction and macrocephaly. Second paper indicates that this KO mice exhibit abnormal social interaction like autism and macrocephaly. 3. What is gonna happen when this protein is removed? PTEN KO mice show macrocephaly in organ and cell level as common feature. Morgan Sheng shows that knockdown of PTEN in CA1 pyramidal neuronal cells in hippocampus increases dendrite branching. 4. Molecular mechanism of PTEN The molecular weight of PTEN is 47kDa. The length of amino acids is 403. Domain structure PTEN s crystal structure has been decided. crystal structure of PTEN Starting from N-terminus, PTEN has catalytic domain, C2 domain and PDZ domain. In addition, PIP2 binding domain is there in N terminus. PTEN also has two PEST domain, which is important for PTEN stability. PTEN-PEST domain PTEN was initially believed to be a dual specificity phospho-tyrosine phosphatase (PTP). PTEN phosphorylates denature focal adhesion kinase (FAK) in vitro, and overexpression of PTEN in mammalian cells decreases FAK phosphorylation. In addition Shc has also been proposed as a substrate of PTEN. However PTEN is strikingly poor catalyst toward most artificial PTP substrates. PTEN prefers negatively charged substrates such as PIP3. In addition, it is reported that several frequently occurring missense mutations in Cowden disease (G129E) and in glioblastoma (R15S and R15I)result in a loss of lipid-specific phosphatase activity, whereas PTP activity is largely unaffected. In 2004, there was the paper in which PTEN downregulation causes decrease in expression level of NMDAR1 and NMDAR2B but not NMDAR2A. PTEN directly binds to NR1 and indirectly binds to NR2B. They found out LTP decrease is caused by PTEN RNAi through NR downregulation. Furthermore, they used C124A and G129E mutation of PTEN. C124A is deficient in phosphatase and PIP3 phosphatase activity. C129E is deficient in only PIP3 phosphatase activity. They found out G129E mutation increases LTP, but C124A decrease LTP with electrophysiology. Taken together, it seems that now PIP3 is preferential substrate for PTEN. Basically C2 domain is involved in Ca++-mediated membrane binding. However the C2 domain of PTEN is in a Ca++ independent manner. From this aspect, PTEN C2 domain is similar with one of novel PKC. PTEN C2 domain is known to bind to phospholipid, like PS. This indicates that mutations in C2 domain of PTEN, which leads to Cowden syndrome, causes deficient in PTEN binding to the plasma membrane, resulting in PIP3 increase. PDZ domain ligand gives binding with a bunch of proteins including NMDA receptor, SAP97 and Bazooka directly. About confomational change of PTEN 1. PIP2 binding. some papers shows that PIP2 activates the phosphatase domain via a conformational change. 2. phosphorylation 3. C2 domain 4. binding to other proteins 5. Localization of PTEN PTEN is expressed in cytosol and nuclear. One paper shows that GSK3beta and casein kinase lead to phosphorylation of PTEN, which leads to recruit PTEN and Myosin V complex to plasma membrane, resulting in PTEN activation. 6. post-translational modification It is reported that casein kinase phosphorylates PTEN, which leads to PTEN activation. ubiquitination oxidation 7. what is the effecter of PTEN? FAK and Shc as well as PIP3 have been reported. 8. what is the regulator of PTEN? It is known that GSK3beta and casein kinase regulate PTEN activity. How to answer for question as follows. It is known that protein tyrosine phosphatase is involved in tumore supressor. However, there is no example of PTPase that function as tumour suppressors. 1997, two groups reported PTEN is plausible candidate, which is located in 10p23. PTEN is mutated and deleted in a wide variety of tumours and tumours cell lines. Also germline transmission of mutations in PTEN were observed in Cowden disease. PTEN is dual phosphatase, which substrates is proteins and PIP3. However, PIP3 regulates Akt, which is related to tumour and survival signaling. So, PTEN s main role concerning to tumour suppressor is most likely PIP3 dephosphorylation. At least, it is reported that PTEN regulates Akt kinase activity in hippocampal neuron and increase sensitivity of apoptosis. You said that PIP3 is produced by mGluR pathway. However, restrict to glutamate uncaging, mGluR pathway seems not to relate to structual plasticity. So How is PIP3 produced? Answer Exactly one paper shows that mGluR is not related to structual plasticity using MCPG. However there are several pathway that regulates PIP3 dynamics. About PI3K, Ras binds to PI3K directly and regulates activity of PI3K. About PTEN, CK2 and GSK3b regulate PTEN activity, leading to reducing PIP3. So, PIP3 increase or decreases occurs using these pathway. I think. why PTEN causes something wrong? Because PI3K has a lot of splicing varients and homologue. However PTEN doesn t have. That is why PTEN cause some wrong.. How is PTEN activated? It remains unknow. One paper says that casein kinase phosphorylates PTEN and PTEN MyosinV complex moves to plasma membrane. casein kinase inhibitor is comercially available. I can examine whether PIP3 decrease abolished by casein kinase inhbitor. About SHIP SHIP is abbrebiation of SH2 domain-containing inositol polyphosphate 5-phosphatase. Findings so far published concerning the functional significance of SHIP are largely confined to the hemopoietic system. In brain, SHIP2 is not significantly expressed in hippocampus. SHIP2 And SHIP reduces the amount of PIP3 and Akt activity in glioblastoma cells. SHIP
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Winter Ward 一定範囲のユニットに冷気への耐性を与えます Winter Ward ジェム 疲労 内部ID 575 1 100 使用 水中判定 効果 効果量 戦闘 水中可 Buff 主属性 主Lv 効果発生数 射程距離 Water 2 1 5 副属性 副Lv 効果範囲 命中補正 - 0 15 0 領域 Lv 防御判定 抵抗判定 Enchantment 5 専用国家 ゲーム内説明文 This spell makes units resistant to cold. It also reduces the chill effect caused by some undead beings. 和訳 この呪文は、対象に寒さへの耐性を与えます。それは、一部のアンデッドが纏う冷気の影響も軽減します。 注記 範囲耐性付与の水担当。よく見ないとWater Wardと紛らわしいが、効果は全く違うので選択の際は注意。 Gemこそ必要だが手頃な使用条件で、敵が冷気を多用してくる状況では何時でも役に立つ。冷気による凍結効果の解除を早める作用もあるので、とくに寒冷地での戦闘ではできるだけ利用しておきたい。 これら他者への耐性付与魔法は全て効果が50%に限定され、完全な対策にはならない。元々50%の耐性を持つ兵であれば100%になるが、それ以下では魔法によって補うことはできない。 とはいえ、単純にダメージが減ること自体は有益には違いない。いくら受けても平気になるのと、耐えられる回数が増えるのとはずいぶんな差があるが、それでもかけないよりは間違いなく良い結果になる。 コメント 名前 コメント
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Los Santos Transit (LST) 概要 解説 保有車両 駅 鉄道路線図 バス路線図 概要 日本語:ロスサントス・トランジット 業種:公共機関(交通局) 上場:BAWSAQ 所在地:- 解説 ロスサントスの交通局。 路線バスとライトレール(旅客鉄道)の運行・管理や、信号機の管理を担当している。 モデルはロサンゼルス郡都市圏交通局 。 路線バスはただのNPC車両なので、乗客として乗り込む事はできない。 また、路線通りにも走行していない。 ライトレールは乗客として乗り込める。 なお、プレイヤーが乗っていない場合は車などの障害物に反応して停車するが、プレイヤーが乗り込んだ場合は進行方向にいかなる障害物があろうと運行を続ける (駅の停止位置でしか止まらない)ため人身事故や衝突事故が多発する。 そもそも何があっても決して止まらない(*1)貨物列車 よりはマシかもしれないが…。 地下鉄区間では至る所で架線から漏電している杜撰な管理体制だが、実際のアメリカの地下鉄もそのような感じなのでモデルを忠実に再現していると言える。 なお、プレイヤーが漏電箇所に触れてもダメージを受けることはない。 路線バスの色のモデルは以下の通り。 オレンジ: Metro Local (路線バス) 赤: Metro Rapid (急行路線バス) 青: Metro Express (高速バス) バス も参照。 ライトレールのモデルはロサンゼルス郡都市圏交通局のMetro Rail 。 車両のモデルはSiemens P2000 。 ちなみに貨物鉄道は別会社のゴー ロコ レールロード (モデルはUnion Pacific Railroad )が運営している。 鉄道路線図も参照。 BAWSAQ「ロスサントス・トランジットは、街の住民が誰も使いたがらない公共交通機関を運行している。」 バス停 保有車両 Bus Metro 駅 鉄道路線図参照 鉄道路線図 クリックで拡大 バス路線図 m101m102m102氏提供
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Los Santos Transit (LST) 概要 解説 保有車両 駅 鉄道路線図 バス路線図 概要 日本語:ロスサントス・トランジット 業種:公共機関(交通局) 上場:BAWSAQ 所在地:- 解説 ロスサントスの交通局。 路線バスとライトレール(旅客鉄道)の運行・管理や、信号機の管理を担当している。 モデルはロサンゼルス郡都市圏交通局 。 路線バスはただのNPC車両なので、乗客として乗り込む事はできない。 また、路線通りにも走行していない。 ライトレールは乗客として乗り込める。 なお、プレイヤーが乗っていない場合は車などの障害物に反応して停車するが、プレイヤーが乗り込んだ場合は進行方向にいかなる障害物があろうと運行を続ける (駅の停止位置でしか止まらない)ため人身事故や衝突事故が多発する。 そもそも何があっても決して止まらない(*1)貨物列車 よりはマシかもしれないが…。 地下鉄区間では至る所で架線から漏電している杜撰な管理体制だが、実際のアメリカの地下鉄もそのような感じなのでモデルを忠実に再現していると言える。 なお、プレイヤーが漏電箇所に触れてもダメージを受けることはない。 路線バスの色のモデルは以下の通り。 オレンジ: Metro Local (路線バス) 赤: Metro Rapid (急行路線バス) 青: Metro Express (高速バス) バス も参照。 ライトレールのモデルはロサンゼルス郡都市圏交通局のMetro Rail 。 車両のモデルはSiemens P2000 。 ちなみに貨物鉄道は別会社のゴー ロコ レールロード (モデルはUnion Pacific Railroad )が運営している。 鉄道路線図も参照。 BAWSAQ「ロスサントス・トランジットは、街の住民が誰も使いたがらない公共交通機関を運行している。」 バス停 保有車両 Bus Metro 駅 鉄道路線図参照 鉄道路線図 クリックで拡大 バス路線図 m101m102m102氏提供
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Henry Wheaton Henry Wheaton (November 27, 1785 - March 11, 1848), American lawyer and diplomat, was born at Providence, Rhode Island. He was the third reporter of decisions for the United States Supreme Court. He graduated from Brown University in 1802, was admitted to the bar in 1805, and, after two years’ study abroad, practiced law at Providence (1807-1812) and at New York City (1812-1827). He was a justice of the Marine Court of the city of New York from 1815 to 1819. From 1816 to 1827 he edited reports of the Supreme Court. Aided by Justice Joseph Story, his reports were known for their comprehensive notes and summaries of the arguments presented by each side. However, the volumes were slow in appearing and costly. Wheaton s successor Richard Peters condensed his work, and Wheaton sued him, claiming infringement of his common-law copyright. The Supreme Court rejected his claim in Wheaton v. Peters, which was the Court s first copyright case. Reference Wikipedia
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Unityをダウンロード Unityには、有料版で販売されている他に無償版があります。今回は、無償版で行っていきます。 まず下のダウンロードページからUnityにアクセスします。 「Download Unity xxx」と表示されたボタンをクリックします。 ダウンロードが完了するとWindowsでは「UnitySetuo-xxx.exe」、Mac OS Xでは「UnitySetup-xxx.dmg」というイメージファイルが保存されます。 ※xxxはバージョンの番号です。 最新バージョン Unity 4.5.4(Windows版 / Mac OS X版) 無料版 以前のバージョン Unity 4.5.3(Windows版 / Mac OS X版) 無料版 Unityをインストール 次にUnityをインストールします。 Windows版とMac OS X版では少しやり方が異なります。 Windows版のインストール Windowsでは、ダウンロードしたファイルをクリックするとインストールが行えます。 「次のプログラムにコンピュータへの変更を許可しますか」とプログラムを起動するとでてくるので「はい」を押してください。 そうすると、インストーラーの画面が表示されます。これはそのまま「next」を押してください。 「License Agreement」画面が表示されます。これは無償版についての利用について説明されています。 個人の学習に使うなら問題がありませんので「I Agree」を押してください。 「Choose Component」画面が表示されたら、すべてにチェックを入れて「next」を押してください。 「Choose Instal Location」画面が表示されたら、このまま変更せず「Install」を押してください。 インストールが開始されます。インストールには、結構な時間がかかります。 インストール作業が終わると「Completing the Unity xxx Setup」画面が表示されます。「Finish」を押すとインストールが終了します。 「Run Unity xxx」にチェックを入れると、インストール終了後に自動でUnityが起動します。 Mac OS X版のインストール ただいま編集中です。
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Logical positivism and logical empiricism, which together formed neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy that embraced verificationism, an approach that sought to legitimize philosophical discourse on a basis shared with the best examples of empirical sciences. In this theory of knowledge, only statements verifiable either logically or empirically would be cognitively meaningful. Seeking to convert philosophy to this new scientific philosophy was aimed to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims.[1] The Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle propounded logical positivism starting in the late 1920s. Interpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein s philosophy of language, logical positivists identified a verifiability principle or criterion of cognitive meaningfulness. From Bertrand Russell s logicism they sought reduction of mathematics to logic as well as Russell s logical atomism, Ernst Mach s phenomenalism—whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, which is the content of all sciences, whether physics or psychology—and Percy Bridgman s musings that others proclaimed as operationalism. Thereby, only the verifiable was scientific and cognitively meaningful, whereas the unverifiable was unscientific, cognitively meaningless "pseudostatements"—metaphysic, emotive, or such—not candidate to further review by philosophers, newly tasked to organize knowledge, not develop new knowledge. Logical positivism became famed for vigorous scientific antirealism to purge science of talk about nature s unobservable aspects—including causality, mechanism, and principles—although that goal has been exaggerated[who said this?]. Still, talk of such unobservables would be metaphorical—direct observations viewed in the abstract—or at worst metaphysical or emotional. Theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws, while theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules. Mathematics of physics would reduce to symbolic logic via logicism, while rational reconstruction would convert ordinary language into standardized equivalents, all networked and united by a logical syntax. A scientific theory would be stated with its method of verification, whereby a logical calculus or empirical operation could verify its falsity or truth. In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and United States. By then, many had replaced Mach s phenomenalism with Neurath s physicalism, and Carnap had sought to replace verification with simply confirmation. With World War II s close in 1945, logical positivism became milder, logical empiricism, led largely by Carl Hempel, in America, who expounded the covering law model of scientific explanation. The logical positivist movement became a major underpinning of analytic philosophy,[2] and dominated Anglosphere philosophy, including philosophy of science, while influencing sciences, into the 1960s. Yet the movement failed to resolve its central problems,[3][4][5] and its doctrines were increasingly assaulted, most trenchantly by W V O Quine, Norwood Hanson, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Carl Hempel. Contents [hide] 1 Roots 1.1 Language 1.2 Logicism 1.3 Empiricism 2 Origins 2.1 Vienna 2.2 Berlin 2.3 Rivals 2.4 Export 3 Principles 3.1 Analytic/synthetic gap 3.2 Observation/theory gap 3.3 Cognitive meaningfulness 3.3.1 Verification 3.3.2 Confirmation 3.3.3 Weak verification 4 Philosophy of science 4.1 Explanation 4.2 Unity of science 4.3 Theory reduction 5 Critics 5.1 Quine 5.2 Hanson 5.3 Popper 5.4 Kuhn 5.5 Putnam 6 Retrospect 7 Footnotes 8 See also 9 References 10 Further reading 11 External links Roots[edit] Language[edit] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by the young Ludwig Wittgenstein, introduced the view of philosophy as "critique of language", offering the possibility of a theoretically principled distinction of intelligible versus nonsensical discourse. Tractatus adhered to a correspondence theory of truth (versus a coherence theory of truth). Wittgenstein s influence also shows in some versions of the verifiability principle.[6][7] In tractarian doctrine, truths of logic are tautologies, a view widely accepted by logical positivists who were also influenced by Wittgenstein s interpretation of probability although, according to Neurath, some logical positivists found Tractatus to contain much metaphysics.[8] Logicism[edit] Gottlob Frege began the program of reducing mathematics to logic, continued it with Bertrand Russell, but lost interest in this logicism, and Russell continued it with Alfred North Whitehead in their monumental Principia Mathematica, inspiring some of the more mathematical logical posivists, such as Hans Hahn and Rudolf Carnap.[9] (Carnap s early anti-metaphysical works employed Russell s theory of types.)[10] Carnap envisioned a universal language that could reconstruct mathematics and thereby encode physics.[9] Yet Kurt Gödel s incompleteness theorem showed this impossible except in trivial cases, and Alfred Tarski s undefinability theorem shattered all hopes of reducing mathematics to logic.[9] Thus, a universal language failed to stem from Carnap s 1934 work Logische Syntax der Sprache (Logical Syntax of Language).[9] Still, some logical positivists, including Carl Hempel, continued support of logicism.[9] Empiricism[edit] In Germany, Hegelian metaphysics was a dominant movement, and Hegelian successors such as F H Bradley explained reality by postulating metaphysical entities lacking empirical basis, drawing reaction in the form of positivism.[11] Starting in the late 19th century, there was "back to Kant" movement. Ernst Mach s positivism and phenomenalism were a major influence. Origins[edit] Vienna[edit] The Vienna Circle, gathering around University of Vienna and Café Central, was led principally by Moritz Schlick. Schlick had held a neo-Kantian position, but later converted, via Carnap s 1928 book Der logische Aufbau der Welt—that is, The Logical Structure of the World—which became Vienna Circle s "bible", Aufbau. A 1929 pamphlet written by Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap summarized the Vienna Circle s positions. Another member of Vienna Circle to later prove very influential was Carl Hempel. A friendly but tenacious critic of the Circle was Karl Popper, whom Neurath nicknamed the "Official Opposition". Carnap and other Vienna Circle members, including Hahn and Neurath, saw need for a weaker criterion of meaningfulness than verifiability.[12] A radical "left" wing—led by Neurath and Carnap—began the program of "liberalization of empiricism", and they also emphasized fallibilism and pragmatics, which latter Carnap even suggested as empiricism s basis.[12] A conservative "right" wing—led by Schlick and Waismann—rejected both the liberalization of empiricism and the epistemological nonfoundationalism of a move from phenomenalism to physicalism.[12] As Neurath and somewhat Carnap posed science toward social reform, the split in Vienna Circle also reflected political views.[12] Berlin[edit] The Berlin Circle was led principally by Hans Reichenbach. Rivals[edit] Both Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap had been influenced by and sought to define logical positivism versus the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer—the then leading figure of Marburg school, so called—and against Edmund Husserl s phenomenology. Logical positivists especially opposed Martin Heidegger s obscure metaphysics, the epitome of what logical positivism rejected. In the early 1930s, Carnap debated Heidegger over "metaphysical pseudosentences".[13] Despite its revolutionary aims, logical positivism was but one view among many vying within Europe, and logical positivists initially spoke their language.[13] Export[edit] As the movement s first emissary to the New World, Moritz Schlick visited Stanford University in 1929, yet otherwise remained in Vienna and was murdered at the University, reportedly by a deranged student, in 1936.[13] That year, a British attendee at some Vienna Circle meetings since 1933, A J Ayer saw his Language, Truth and Logic, written in English, import logical positivism to the Anglosphere. By then, Nazi political party s 1933 rise to power in Germany had triggered flight of intellectuals.[13] In exile in England, Otto Neurath died in 1945.[13] Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and Carl Hempel—Carnap s protégé who had studied in Berlin with Reichenbach—settled permanently in America.[13] Upon Germany s annexation of Austria in 1939, remaining logical positivists, many of whom were also Jewish, were targeted and continued flight. Logical positivism thus became dominant in the Anglosphere. Principles[edit] Analytic/synthetic gap[edit] Concerning reality, the necessary is a state true in all possible worlds—mere logical validity—whereas the contingent hinges on the way the particular world is. Concerning knowledge, the a priori is knowable before or without, whereas the a posteriori is knowable only after or through, relevant experience. Concerning statements, the analytic is true via terms arrangement and meanings, thus a tautology—true by logical necessity but uninformative about the world—whereas the synthetic adds reference to a state of facts, a contingency. In 1739, Hume cast a fork aggressively dividing "relations of ideas" from "matters of fact and real existence", such that all truths are of one type or the other.[14][15] By Hume s fork, truths by relations among ideas (abstract) all align on one side (analytic, necessary, a priori), whereas truths by states of actualities (concrete) always align on the other side (synthetic, contingent, a posteriori).[14] At any treatises containing neither, Hume orders, "Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion".[14] Thus awakened from "dogmatic slumber", Kant quested to answer Hume s challenge—but by explaining how metaphysics is possible. Eventually, in his 1781 work, Kant crossed the tines of Hume s fork to identify another range of truths by necessity—synthetic a priori, statements claiming states of facts but known true before experience—by arriving at transcendental idealism, attributing the mind a constructive role in phenomena by arranging sense data into the very experience space, time, and substance. Thus, Kant saved Newton s law of universal gravitation from Hume s problem of induction by finding uniformity of nature to be a priori knowledge. Logical positivists rejected Kant s synthethic a priori, and staked Hume s fork, whereby a statement is either analytic and a priori (thus necessary and verifiable logically) or synthetic and a posteriori (thus contingent and verifiable empirically).[14] Observation/theory gap[edit] Early, most logical positivists proposed that all knowledge is based on logical inference from simple "protocol sentences" grounded in observable facts. In the 1936 and 1937 papers "Testability and meaning", individual terms replace sentences as the units of meaning.[12] Further, theoretical terms no longer need to acquire meaning by explicit definition from observational terms the connection may be indirect, through a system of implicit definitions.[12] (Carnap also provides an important, pioneering discussion of disposition predicates.)[12] Cognitive meaningfulness[edit] Verification[edit] The logical positivists initial stance was that a statement is "cognitively meaningful" only if some finite procedure conclusively determines its truth.[16] By this verifiability principle, only statements verifiable either by their analyticity or by empiricism were cognitively meaningful. Metaphysics, ontology, as well as much of ethics failed this criterion, and so were found cognitively meaningless. Moritz Schlick, however, did not view ethical or aesthetic statements as cognitively meaningless.[17] Cognitive meaningfulness was variously defined having a truth value; corresponding to a possible state of affairs; naming a proposition; intelligible or understandable as are scientific statements.[18] Ethics and aesthetics were subjective preferences, while theology and other metaphysics contained "pseudostatements", neither true nor false. This meaningfulness was cognitive, although other types of meaningfulness—for instance, emotive, expressive, or figurative—occurred in metaphysical discourse, dismissed from further review. Thus, logical positivism indirectly asserted Hume s law, the principle that is statements cannot justify ought statements, but are separated by an unbridgeable gap. A J Ayer s 1936 book asserted an extreme variant—the boo/hooray doctrine—whereby all evaluative judgments are but emotional reactions. Confirmation[edit] In an important pair of papers in 1936 and 1937, "Testability and meaning", Carnap replaced verification with confirmation, on the view that although universal laws cannot be verified they can be confirmed.[12] Later, Carnap employed abundant logical and mathematical methods in researching inductive logic while seeking to provide and account of probability as "degree of confirmation", but was never able to formulate a model.[19] In Carnap s inductive logic, every universal law s degree of confirmation is always zero.[19] In any event, the precise formulation of what came to be called the "criterion of cognitive significance" took three decades (Hempel 1950, Carnap 1956, Carnap 1961).[12] Carl Hempel became a major critic within the logical positivism movement.[20] Hempel elucidated the paradox of confirmation. Weak verification[edit] The second edition of A J Ayer s book arrived in 1946, and discerned strong versus weak forms of verification. Ayer concluded, "A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established by experience", but is verifiable in the weak sense "if it is possible for experience to render it probable".[21] And yet, "no proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis".[21] Thus, all are open to weak verification. Philosophy of science[edit] Upon the global defeat of Nazism, and removed from philosophy rivials for radical reform—Marburg neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger s "existential hermeneutics"—while hosted in the climate of American pragmatism and commonsense empiricism, the neopositivists shed much of their earlier, revolutionary zeal.[1] No longer crusading to revise traditional philosophy into a new scientific philosophy, they became respectable members of a new philosophy subdiscipline, philosophy of science.[1] Receiving support from Ernest Nagel, logical empiricists were especially influential in the social sciences.[22] Explanation[edit] Comtean positivism had viewed science as description, whereas the logical positivists posed science as explanation, perhaps to better realize the envisioned unity of science by covering not only fundamental science—that is, fundamental physics—but the special sciences, too, for instance biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and economics.[23] The most widely accepted concept of scientific explanation, held even by neopositivist critic Karl Popper, was the deductive-nomological model (DN model).[24] Yet DN model received its greatest explication by Carl Hempel, first in his 1942 article "The function of general laws in history", and more explicitly with Paul Oppenheim in their 1948 article "Studies in the logic of explanation".[24] In DN model, the stated phenomenon to be explained is the explanandum—which can be an event, law, or theory—whereas premises stated to explain it are the explanans.[25] Explanans must be true or highly confirmed, contain at least one law, and entail the explanandum.[25] Thus, given initial conditions C1, C2 . . . Cn plus general laws L1, L2 . . . Ln, event E is a deductive consequence and scientifically explained.[25] In DN model, a law is an unrestricted generalization by conditional proposition—If A, then B—and has empirical content testable.[26] (Differing from a merely true regularity—for instance, George always carries only $1 bills in his wallet—a law suggests what must be true,[27] and is consequent of a scientific theory s axiomatic structure.[28]) By the Humean empiricist view that humans observe sequence of events, not cause and effect—as causality and causal mechanisms are unobservable—DN model neglects causality beyond mere constant conjunction, first event A and then always event B.[23] Hempel s explication of DN model held natural laws—empirically confirmed regularities—as satisfactory and, if formulated realistically, approximating causal explanation.[25] In later articles, Hempel defended DN model and proposed a probabilistic explanation, inductive-statistical model (IS model).[25] DN model and IS model together form covering law model,[25] as named by a critic, William Dray.[29] (Derivation of statistical laws from other statistical laws goes to deductive-statistical model (DS model).)[30] Georg Hendrik von Wright, another critic, named it subsumption theory,[31] fitting the ambition of theory reduction. Unity of science[edit] Logical positivists were generally committed to "Unified Science", and sought a common language or, in Neurath s phrase, a "universal slang" whereby which all scientific propositions could be expressed.[32] The adequacy of proposals or fragments of proposals for such a language was often asserted on the basis of various "reductions" or "explications" of the terms of one special science to the terms of another, putatively more fundamental. Sometimes these reductions consisted of set-theoretic manipulations of a few logically primitive concepts (as in Carnap s Logical Structure of the World (1928)). Sometimes, these reductions consisted of allegedly analytic or a priori deductive relationships (as in Carnap s "Testability and meaning"). A number of publications over a period of thirty years would attempt to elucidate this concept. Theory reduction[edit] As in Comptean positivism s envisioned unity of science, neopositivists aimed to network all special sciences through the covering law model of scientific explanation. And ultimately, by supplying boundary conditions and supplying bridge laws within the covering law model, all the special sciences laws would reduce to fundamental physics, the fundamental science. Critics[edit] After the Second World War s close in 1945, key tenets of logical positivism, including its atomistic philosophy of science, the verifiability principle, and the fact/value gap, drew escalated criticism. It was clear that empirical claims cannot be verified to be universally true.[12] Thus, as initially stated, the verifiability criterion made universal statements meaningless, and even made statements beyond empiricism for technological but not conceptual reasons meaningless, which would pose significant problems for science.[20][33][34] These problems were recognized within the movement, which hosted attempted solutions—Carnap s move to confirmation, Ayer s acceptance of weak verification—but the program drew sustained criticism from a number of directions by the 1950s. Even philosophers disagreeing among themselves on which direction general epistemology ought to take, as well as on philosophy of science, agreed that the logical empiricist program was untenable, and it became viewed as selfcontradictory.[35] The verifiability criterion of meaning was itself unverified.[35] Notable critics were Nelson Goodman, Willard Van Orman Quine, Norwood Hanson, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, J L Austin, Peter Strawson, Hilary Putnam, Ludwig von Mises, and Richard Rorty. Quine[edit] Although quite empiricist, American logician Willard Van Orman Quine published the 1951 paper "Two dogmas of empiricism",[36] which challenged conventional empiricist presumptions. Quine attacked the analytic/synthetic division, which the verificationist program had been hinged upon in order to entail, by consequence of Hume s fork, both necessity and apriocity. Quine s ontological relativity explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker s conception of the entire world. Quine later proposed naturalized epistemology. Hanson[edit] In 1958, Norwood Hanson s Patterns of Discovery undermined the division of observation versus theory,[37] as one can predict, collect, prioritize, and assess data only via some horizon of expectation set by a theory. Thus, any dataset—the direct observations, the scientific facts—is laden with theory. Popper[edit] An early, tenacious critic was Karl Popper whose 1934 book Logik der Forschung, arriving in English in 1959 as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, directly answered verificationism. Popper heeded the problem of induction as rendering empirical verification logically impossible.[38] And the deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent reveals any phenomenon s capacity to host over one logically possible explanation. Accepting scientific method as hypotheticodeduction, whose inference form is denying the consequent, Popper finds scientific method unable to proceed without falsifiable predictions. Popper thus identifies falsifiability to demarcate not meaningful from meaningless but simply scientific from unscientific—a label not in itself unfavorable. Popper finds virtue in metaphysics, required to develop new scientific theories. And an unfalsifiable—thus unscientific, perhaps metaphysical—concept in one era can later, through evolving knowledge or technology, become falsifiable, thus scientific. Popper also found science s quest for truth to rest on values. Popper disparages the pseudoscientific, which occurs when an unscientific theory is proclaimed true and coupled with seemingly scientific method by "testing" the unfalsifiable theory—whose predictions are confirmed by necessity—or when a scientific theory s falsifiable predictions are strongly falsified but the theory is persistently protected by "immunizing stratagems", such as the appendage of ad hoc clauses saving the theory or the recourse to increasingly speculative hypotheses shielding the theory. Popper s scientific epistemology is falsificationism, which finds that no number, degree, and variety of empirical successes can either verify or confirm scientific theory. Falsificationism finds science s aim as corroboration of scientific theory, which strives for scientific realism but accepts the maximal status of strongly corroborated verisimilitude ("truthlikeness"). Explicitly denying the positivist view that all knowledge is scientific, Popper developed the general epistemology critical rationalism, which finds human knowledge to evolve by conjectures and refutations. Popper thus acknowledged the value of the positivist movement, driving evolution of human understanding, but claimed that he had "killed positivism". Kuhn[edit] With his landmark, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn critically destabilized the verificationist program, which was presumed to call for foundationalism. (Actually, even in the 1930s, Otto Neurath had argued for nonfoundationalism via coherentism by likening science to a boat that scientists must rebuild at sea[citation needed].) Although Kuhn s thesis itself was attacked even by opponents of neopositivism, in the 1970 postscript to Structure, Kuhn asserted, at least, that there was no algorithm to science—and, on that, even most of Kuhn s critics agreed. Powerful and persuasive, Kuhn s book, unlike the vocabulary and symbols of logic s formal language, was written in natural language open to the laypersons.[39] Ironically, Kuhn s book was first published in a volume of Encyclopedia of Unified Science—a project begun by logical positivists—and some sense unified science, indeed, but by bringing it into the realm of historical and social assessment, rather than fitting it to the model of physics.[39] Kuhn s ideas were rapidly adopted by scholars in disciplines well outside natural sciences,[39] and, as logical empiricists were extremely influential in the social sciences,[22] ushered academia into postpositivism or postempiricism.[39] Putnam[edit] The "received view" operates on the correspondence rule that states, "The observational terms are taken as referring to specified phenomena or phenomenal properties, and the only interpretation given to the theoretical terms is their explicit definition provided by the correspondence rules".[11] According to Hilary Putnam, a former student of Reichenbach and of Carnap, the dichotomy of observational terms versus theoretical terms introduced a problem within scientific discussion that was nonexistent until this dichotomy was stated by logical positivists.[40] Putnam s four objections Something is referred to as "observational" if it is observable directly with our senses. Then an observation term cannot be applied to something unobservable. If this is the case, there are no observation terms. With Carnap s classification, some unobservable terms are not even theoretical and belong to neither observation terms nor theoretical terms. Some theoretical terms refer primarily to observation terms. Reports of observation terms frequently contain theoretical terms. A scientific theory may not contain any theoretical terms (an example of this is Darwin s original theory of evolution). Putman also alleged that positivism was actually a form of metaphysical idealism by its rejecting scientific theory s ability to garner knowledge about nature s unobservable aspects. With his "no miracles" argument, posed in 1974, Putnam asserted scientific realism, the stance that science achieves true—or approximately true—knowledge of the world as it exists independently of humans sensory experience. In this, Putnam opposed not only the positivism but other instrumentalism—whereby scientific theory as but a human tool to predict human observations—filling the void left by positivism s decline. Retrospect[edit] By the late 1960s, the neopositivist movement had clearly run its course.[41] Interviewed in the late 1970s, A J Ayer supposed that "the most important" defect "was that nearly all of it was false".[42][43] Although logical positivism tends to be recalled as a pillar of scientism,[44] Carl Hempel was key in establishing the philosophy subdiscipline philosophy of science[13] where Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper brought in the era postpositivism.[39] John Passmore found logical positivism to be "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes".[42] Logical positivism s fall reopened debate over the metaphysical merit of scientific theory, whether it can offer knowledge of the world beyond human experience (scientific realism) versus whether it is but a human tool to predict human experience (instrumentalism).[45][46] Meanwhile, it became popular among philosophers to rehash the faults and failures of logical positivism without investigation of it.[47] Thereby, logical positivism has been generally misrepresented, sometimes severely.[48] Arguing for their own views, often framed versus logical positivism, many philosophers have reduced logical positivism to simplisms and stereotypes, especially the notion of logical positivism as a type of foundationalism.[48] In any event, the movement helped anchor analytic philosophy in the Anglosphere, and returned Britain to empiricism. Minus logical positivists, tremendously influential outside philosophy, especially in psychology and social sciences, intellectual life of the 20th century would be unrecognizable.[13] Footnotes[edit] ^ Jump up to a b c Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (New York Cambridge University Press, 1999), p xiv. Jump up ^ See "Vienna Circle" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Jump up ^ Smith, L.D. (1986). Behaviorism and Logical Positivism A Reassessment of the Alliance. Stanford University Press. p. 314. ISBN 9780804713016. LCCN 85030366. The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness. Until a competing tradition emerged (about the late 1950 s), the problems of logical positivism continued to be attacked from within that tradition. But as the new tradition in the philosophy of science began to demonstrate its effectiveness—by dissolving and rephrasing old problems as well as by generating new ones—philosophers began to shift allegiances to the new tradition, even though that tradition has yet to receive a canonical formulation. Jump up ^ Bunge, M.A. (1996). Finding Philosophy in Social Science. Yale University Press. p. 317. ISBN 9780300066067. LCCN lc96004399. To conclude, logical positivism was progressive compared with the classical positivism of Ptolemy, Hume, d Alembert, Compte, John Stuart Mill, and Ernst Mach. It was even more so by comparison with its contemporary rivals—neo-Thomisism, neo-Kantianism, intuitionism, dialectical materialism, phenomenology, and existentialism. However, neo-positivism failed dismally to give a faithful account of science, whether natural or social. It failed because it remained anchored to sense-data and to a phenomenalist metaphysics, overrated the power of induction and underrated that of hypothesis, and denounced realism and materialism as metaphysical nonsense. Although it has never been practiced consistently in the advanced natural sciences and has been criticized by many philosophers, notably Popper (1959 [1935], 1963), logical positivism remains the tacit philosophy of many scientists. Regrettably, the anti-positivism fashionable in the metatheory of social science is often nothing but an excuse for sloppiness and wild speculation. Jump up ^ "Popper, Falsifiability, and the Failure of Positivism". 7 August 2000. Retrieved 30 June 2012. The upshot is that the positivists seem caught between insisting on the V.C. [Verifiability Criterion]—but for no defensible reason—or admitting that the V.C. requires a background language, etc., which opens the door to relativism, etc. In light of this dilemma, many folk—especially following Popper s "last-ditch" effort to "save" empiricism/positivism/realism with the falsifiability criterion—have agreed that positivism is a dead-end. Jump up ^ For example, compare "Proposition 4.024" of Tractatus, asserting that we understand a proposition when we know the outcome if it is true, with Schlick s asserting, "To state the circumstances under which a proposition is true is the same as stating its meaning". Jump up ^ "Positivismus und realismus", Erkenntnis 3 1–31, English trans in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed, Logical Empiricism at its Peak Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath (New York Garland Publishing, 1996), p 38. Jump up ^ For summary of the effect of Tractatus on logical positivists, see the Entwicklung der Thesen des "Wiener Kreises". ^ Jump up to a b c d e Jaako Hintikka, "Logicism", in Andrew D Irvine, ed, Philosophy of Mathematics (Burlington MA North Holland, 2009), pp 283–84. Jump up ^ See Rudolf Carnap, "The elimination Of metaphysics through logical analysis of language", Erkenntnis, 1932;2, reprinted in Logical Positivism, Alfred Jules Ayer, ed, (New York Free Press, 1959), pp 60–81. ^ Jump up to a b Frederick Suppe, "The positivist model of scientific theories", in Scientific Inquiry, Robert Klee, ed, (New York Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 16-24. ^ Jump up to a b c d e f g h i j Sarkar, S; Pfeifer, J (2005). The Philosophy of Science An Encyclopedia 1. Taylor Francis. p. 83. ISBN 9780415939270. ^ Jump up to a b c d e f g h Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge U P, 1999), p xii. ^ Jump up to a b c d Antony G Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, rev 2nd edn (New York St Martin s Press, 1984), "Hume s fork", p 156. Jump up ^ Helen B Mitchell, Roots of Wisdom A Tapestry of Philosophical Traditions A Tapestry of Philosophical Traditions, 6th edn (Boston Wadsworth, 2011), "Hume s fork and logical positivism", pp 249-50. Jump up ^ For a classic survey of other versions of verificationism, see Carl G Hempel, "Problems and changes in the empiricist criterion of meaning", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1950;41 41-63. Jump up ^ See Moritz Schlick, "The future Of philosophy", in The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty, ed, (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp 43-53. Jump up ^ Examples of these different views can be found in Scheffler s Anatomy of Inquiry, Ayer s Language, Truth, and Logic, Schlick s "Positivism and realism" (reprinted in Sarkar 1996 and Ayer 1959), and Carnap s Philosophy and Logical Syntax. ^ Jump up to a b Mauro Murzi "Rudolf Carnap (1891—1970)", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 12 Apr 2001. ^ Jump up to a b Fetzer, James (2012). Edward N. Zalta, ed. "Carl Hempel". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 ed.). It would fall to Hempel to become perhaps the most astute critic of that movement and to contribute to its refinement as logical empiricism... Hempel himself attained a certain degree of prominence as a critic of this movement... The analytic/synthetic distinction and the observational/theoretical distinction were tied together by the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness... By this standard, sentences that are non-analytic but also non-verifiable, including various theological or metaphysical assertions concerning God or The Absolute, qualify as cognitively meaningless. This was viewed as a desirable result. But, as Hempel would demonstrate, its scope was far too sweeping, since it also rendered meaningless the distinctively scientific assertions made by laws and theories... The analytic/synthetic distinction took a decided hit when the noted logician, Willard van Orman Quine, published "Two dogmas of empiricism" (1953), challenging its adequacy... While the analytic/synthetic distinction appears to be justifiable in modeling important properties of languages, the observational/theoretical distinction does not fare equally well. Within logical positivism, observation language was assumed to consist of names and predicates whose applicability or not can be ascertained, under suitable conditions, by means of direct observation... Karl Popper (1965, 1968), however, would carry the argument in a different direction by looking at the ontic nature of properties... Hempel (1950, 1951), meanwhile, demonstrated that the verifiability criterion could not be sustained. Since it restricts empirical knowledge to observation sentences and their deductive consequences, scientific theories are reduced to logical constructions from observables. In a series of studies about cognitive significance and empirical testability, he demonstrated that the verifiability criterion implies that existential generalizations are meaningful, but that universal generalizations are not, even though they include general laws, the principal objects of scientific discovery. Hypotheses about relative frequencies in finite sequences are meaningful, but hypotheses concerning limits in infinite sequences are not. The verifiability criterion thus imposed a standard that was too strong to accommodate the characteristic claims of science and was not justifiable... Both theoretical and dispositional predicates, which refer to non-observables, posed serious problems for the positivist position, since the verifiability criterion implies they must be reducible to observables or are empirically meaningless... The need to dismantle the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness together with the demise of the observational/theoretical distinction meant that logical positivism no longer represented a rationally defensible position. At least two of its defining tenets had been shown to be without merit. Since most philosophers believed that Quine had shown the analytic/synthetic distinction was also untenable, moreover, many concluded that the enterprise had been a total failure. Among the important benefits of Hempel s critique, however, was the production of more general and flexible criteria of cognitive significance... Hempel suggested multiple criteria for assessing the cognitive significance of different theoretical systems, where significance is not categorical but rather a matter of degree... The elegance of Hempel s study laid to rest any lingering aspirations for simple criteria of cognitive significance and signaled the demise of logical positivism as a philosophical movement. Precisely what remained, however, was in doubt. Presumably, anyone who rejected one or more of the three principles defining positivism—the analytic/synthetic distinction, the observational/theoretical distinction, and the verifiability criterion of significance—was not a logical positivist. The precise outlines of its philosophical successor, which would be known as "logical empiricism", were not entirely evident. Perhaps this study came the closest to defining its intellectual core. Those who accepted Hempel s four criteria and viewed cognitive significance as a matter of degree were members, at least in spirit. But some new problems were beginning to surface with respect to Hempel s covering-law explication of explanation and old problems remained from his studies of induction, the most remarkable of which was known as "the paradox of confirmation". ^ Jump up to a b Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1946, p 50–51. ^ Jump up to a b Novick, That Noble Dream (Cambridge U P, 1988), p 546. ^ Jump up to a b James Woodward, "Scientific explanation"—sec 1 "Background and introduction", in Zalta EN, ed,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2011 edn ^ Jump up to a b James Woodward, "Scientific explanation"—Article overview, Zalta EN, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2011 edn ^ Jump up to a b c d e f Suppe, Structure of Scientific Theories (U Illinois P, 1977), pp 619–21. Jump up ^ Eleonora Montuschi, Objects in Social Science (London New York Continuum, 2003), pp 61–62. Jump up ^ Bechtel, Philosophy of Science (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1988), p 25. Jump up ^ Bechtel, Philosophy of Science (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1988), pp 27–28. Jump up ^ Georg Hendrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press, 1971), p 11. Jump up ^ Stuart Glennan, p 276, in Sarkar S Pfeifer J, eds, The Philosophy of Science An Encyclopedia, Volume 1 A–M (New York Routledge, 2006). Jump up ^ Manfred Riedel, pp 3–4, in Manninen J Tuomela R, eds, Essays on Explanation and Understanding Studies in the Foundation of Humanities and Social Sciences (Dordrecht D Reidel Publishing, 1976). Jump up ^ For a review of "unity of science" to, see Gregory Frost-Arnold, "The large-scale structure of logical empiricism Unity of science and the rejection of metaphysics". Jump up ^ John Vicker (2011). Edward N Zalta, ed. "The problem of induction". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 ed.). This initial formulation of the criterion was soon seen to be too strong; it counted as meaningless not only metaphysical statements but also statements that are clearly empirically meaningful, such as that all copper conducts electricity and, indeed, any universally quantified statement of infinite scope, as well as statements that were at the time beyond the reach of experience for technical, and not conceptual, reasons, such as that there are mountains on the back side of the moon. These difficulties led to modification of the criterion The latter to allow empirical verification if not in fact then at least in principle, the former to soften verification to empirical confirmation. Jump up ^ Uebel, Thomas (2008). Edward N. Zalta, ed. "Vienna Circle". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). What Carnap later called the "liberalization of empiricism" was underway and different camps became discernible within the Circle... In the first place, this liberalization meant the accommodation of universally quantified statements and the return, as it were, to salient aspects of Carnap s 1928 conception. Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless. Schlick (1931) thus followed Wittgenstein s own suggestion to treat them instead as representing rules for the formation of verifiable singular statements. (His abandonment of conclusive verifiability is indicated only in Schlick 1936a.) A second element that began to do so soon was the recognition of the problem of the irreducibility of disposition terms to observation terms... A third element was that disagreement arose as to whether the in-principle verifiability or support turned on what was merely logically possible or on what was nomologically possible, as a matter of physical law etc. A fourth element, finally, was that differences emerged as to whether the criterion of significance was to apply to all languages or whether it was to apply primarily to constructed, formal languages. Schlick retained the focus on logical possibility and natural languages throughout, but Carnap had firmly settled his focus on nomological possibility and constructed languages by the mid-thirties. Concerned with natural language, Schlick (1932, 1936a) deemed all statements meaningful for which it was logically possible to conceive of a procedure of verification; concerned with constructed languages only, Carnap (1936-37) deemed meaningful only statements for whom it was nomologically possible to conceive of a procedure of confirmation of disconfirmation. Many of these issues were openly discussed at the Paris congress in 1935. Already in 1932 Carnap had sought to sharpen his previous criterion by stipulating that those statements were meaningful that were syntactically well-formed and whose non-logical terms were reducible to terms occurring in the basic observational evidence statements of science. While Carnap s focus on the reduction of descriptive terms allows for the conclusive verification of some statements, his criterion also allowed universally quantified statements to be meaningful, provided they were syntactically and terminologically correct (1932a, §2). It was not until one of his Paris addresses, however, that Carnap officially declared the meaning criterion to be mere confirmability. Carnap s new criterion required neither verification nor falsification but only partial testability so as now to include not only universal statements but also the disposition statements of science... Though plausible initially, the device of introducing non-observational terms in this way gave rise to a number of difficulties which impugned the supposedly clear distinctions between logical and empirical matters and analytic and synthetic statements (Hempel 1951). Independently, Carnap himself (1939) soon gave up the hope that all theoretical terms of science could be related to an observational base by such reduction chains. This admission raised a serious problem for the formulation of a meaning criterion how was one to rule out unwanted metaphysical claims while admitting as significant highly abstract scientific claims? ^ Jump up to a b Hilary Putnam (1985). Philosophical Papers Volume 3, Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press. p. 184. ISBN 9780521313940. LCCN lc82012903. Jump up ^ W V O Quine, "Two dogmas of empiricism", Philosophical Review 1951;60 20-43, collected in Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 1953). Jump up ^ Novick, That Noble Dream (Cambridge U P, 1988), p 527. Jump up ^ Popper then denies that science requires inductive inference or that it actually exists, although most philosophers believe it exists and that science requires it [Samir Okasha, The Philosophy of Science A Very Short Introduction (NY OUP, 2002), p 23]. ^ Jump up to a b c d e Novick, That Noble Dream (Cambridge U P, 1988), pp 526-27. Jump up ^ Hilary Putnam, "Problems with the observational/theoretical distinction", in Scientific Inquiry, Robert Klee, ed (New York, USA Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 25-29. Jump up ^ Nicholas G Fotion (1995). Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford Oxford University Press. p. 508. ISBN 0-19-866132-0. ^ Jump up to a b Hanfling, Oswald (2003). "Logical Positivism". Routledge History of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 193f. Jump up ^ "Ayer on Logical Positivism Section 4". 6 30. Jump up ^ Stahl et al, Webs of Reality (Rutgers U P, 2002), p 180. Jump up ^ Hilary Putnam, "What is realism?", in Jarrett Leplin, ed, Scientific Realism (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London University of California Press, 1984), p 140. Jump up ^ Ruth Lane, "Positivism, scientific realism and political science Recent developments in the philosophy of science", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996 Jul8(3) 361-82, abstract. Jump up ^ Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge, 1999), p 1. ^ Jump up to a b Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge, 1999), p 2.
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Nintendo DS 発売日 タイトル メーカー CERO 2004/12/02 ポケモンダッシュ ポケモン/任天堂 全年齢 2005/03/17 牧場物語 コロボックルステーション マーベラスインタラクティブ 全年齢 2005/05/19 東北大学未来科学技術共同研究センター 川島隆太教授監修 脳を鍛える大人のDSトレーニング 任天堂 全年齢 2005/09/15 逆転裁判 蘇る逆転 カプコン B (暴力, セクシャル) 2005/10/20 ポケモントローゼ ポケモン/任天堂 全年齢 2005/11/03 だれでもアソビ大全 任天堂 全年齢 2005/11/23 おいでよ どうぶつの森 任天堂 全年齢 2005/12/01 ドラゴンボールZ 舞空烈戦 バンダイ 全年齢 2005/12/29 東北大学未来科学技術共同研究センター 川島隆太教授監修 もっと脳を鍛える大人のDSトレーニング 任天堂 全年齢 2006/01/19 メトロイドプライム ピンボール 任天堂 全年齢 2006/01/26 英語が苦手な大人のDSトレーニング えいご漬け 任天堂 全年齢 2006/01/26 BLEACH DS 蒼天に駆ける運命 セガ 全年齢 2006/02/02 アイシールド21 MAX DEVILPOWER! 任天堂 全年齢 2006/02/23 いつでもどこでもできる将棋 AI将棋DS マーベラスインタラクティブ 全年齢 2006/03/23 ポケモンレンジャー ポケモン/任天堂 全年齢 2006/03/23 パズルシリーズ Vol.3 SUDOKU ハドソン 全年齢 2006/04/20 旅の指さし会話帳DS DSシリーズ2 中国 任天堂 A 2006/06/22 マジカルバケーション 5つの星がならぶとき 任天堂 A 2006/07/20 しゃべる!DSお料理ナビ 任天堂 A 2006/07/27 マリオバスケ 3on3 任天堂 A 2006/08/24 ルーンファクトリー ―新牧場物語― マーベラスインタラクティブ A 2006/09/02 もぎたてチンクルのばら色ルッピーランド 任天堂 A 2006/09/21 銀魂でぃ~えす 万事屋大騒動! バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2006/09/28 ポケットモンスター ダイヤモンド/パール ポケモン/任天堂 A 2006/09/28 財団法人 日本漢字能力検定協会公認 漢検DS ロケットカンパニー A 2006/10/26 監修日本常識力検定協会 いまさら人には聞けない 大人の常識力トレーニングDS 任天堂 A 2006/10/26 逆転裁判2 (DS) カプコン A 2006/11/02 ワールドサッカー ウイニングイレブンDS コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2006/12/07 きらりん☆レボリューション なーさんといっしょ コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2006/12/14 流星のロックマン ペガサス/レオ/ドラゴン カプコン A 2006/12/21 SIMPLE DSシリーズVOL.10 THE どこでも漢字クイズ ディースリー・パブリッシャー A 2006/12/21 パズルシリーズ Vol.9 SUDOKU2 Deluxe ハドソン A 2006/12/21 平成教育委員会DS バンダイナムコゲームス (ナムコ) A 2007/01/18 怪盗 ワリオ・ザ・セブン 任天堂 A 2007/01/25 ウィッシュルーム 天使の記憶 任天堂 A 2007/01/25 ピクロスDS 任天堂 A 2007/01/25 三国志大戦DS セガ B (セクシャル) 2007/02/15 BLEACH DS 2nd 黒衣ひらめく鎮魂歌 セガ A 2007/02/15 レイトン教授と不思議な町 レベルファイブ A 2007/02/22 シムシティDS エレクトロニック・アーツ A 2007/03/08 ヨッシーアイランドDS 任天堂 A 2007/03/08 パズルシリーズ Vol.11 ぬりかべ ハドソン A 2007/03/08 パズルシリーズ Vol.12 美術館 ハドソン A 2007/03/15 遊戯王デュエルモンスターズ ワールドチャンピオンシップ2007 コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2007/03/29 英語が苦手な大人のDSトレーニング もっとえいご漬け 任天堂 A 2007/04/05 DS陰山メソッド 電脳反復 正しい漢字 かきとりくん 小学館 A 2007/04/12 逆転裁判4 カプコン A 2007/04/19 リーズのアトリエ ~オルドールの錬金術士~ ガスト A 2007/04/19 のだめカンタービレ バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2007/04/26 ピクピク ~解くと絵になる3つのパズル~ サクセス A 2007/05/24 結界師 烏森妖奇談 バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2007/06/07 数陣タイセン 任天堂 A 2007/06/23 ゼルダの伝説 夢幻の砂時計 任天堂 A 2007/07/12 がんばる私の家計ダイアリー 任天堂 A 2007/07/12 きらりん☆レボリューション めざせ!アイドルクイーン コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2007/07/27 すばらしきこのせかい スクウェア・エニックス A 2007/08/09 SDガンダム Gジェネレーション クロスドライブ バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2007/08/23 逆転裁判3 (DS) カプコン B (暴力) 2007/08/23 ファイナルファンタジー・クリスタルクロニクル リング・オブ・フェイト スクウェア・エニックス A 2007/08/30 サモンナイト ツインエイジ ~精霊たちの共鳴~ バンプレスト A 2007/09/20 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS フレイムランブル 開炎 リング争奪戦! タカラトミー A 2007/09/27 ピクトイメージDS セガ A 2007/09/27 財団法人 日本漢字能力検定協会公認 漢検DS2+常用漢字辞典 ロケットカンパニー A 2007/10/04 アルカイック シールド ヒート 任天堂 A 2007/10/11 DS西村京太郎サスペンス 新探偵シリーズ 京都・熱海・絶景の孤島 殺意の罠 テクモ C (暴力) 2007/10/18 DS文学全集 任天堂 教育・データベース 2007/10/25 ワールドサッカー ウイニングイレブンDS ゴール×ゴール! コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2007/12/13 きらりん☆レボリューション つくってみせちゃお!キメ☆きらステージ コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2007/12/20 高速カードバトル カードヒーロー 任天堂 A 2007/12/20 ドラベース ドラマチック・スタジアム バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2008/01/17 マリオ&ソニック AT 北京オリンピック 任天堂 A 2008/02/21 世界樹の迷宮II 諸王の聖杯 アトラス A 2008/03/19 タイムホロウ 奪われた過去を求めて コナミデジタルエンタテインメント B (暴力) 2008/03/20 ポケモンレンジャー バトナージ ポケモン/任天堂 A 2008/03/27 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS ボンゴレ式対戦バトルすごろく タカラトミー A 2008/05/01 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS フェイトオブヒート 炎の運命 タカラトミー A 2008/06/12 必勝パチンコ★パチスロ攻略シリーズDS VOL2 CR新世紀エヴァンゲリオン ~使徒、再び~ ディースリー・パブリッシャー B (セクシャル) 2008/06/26 大合奏!バンドブラザーズDX 任天堂 A 2008/06/26 ダービースタリオンDS エンターブレイン A 2008/07/24 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS フレイムランブル超 燃えよ未来 タカラトミー A 2008/08/21 遙かなる時空の中で 夢浮橋 コーエー B (恋愛) 2008/09/12 クイズマジックアカデミーDS コナミデジタルエンタテインメント B (セクシャル) 2008/09/18 落シ刑事 ~刑事さん、私がやりました~ サクセス A 2008/09/25 ワールド・デストラクション ~導かれし意思~ セガ B (セクシャル, 犯罪) 2008/10/16 カルドセプトDS セガ B (セクシャル) 2008/10/23 わがままファッション ガールズモード 任天堂 A 2008/11/13 とんがりボウシと魔法の365にち コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2008/11/13 DS西村京太郎サスペンス2 新探偵シリーズ 金沢・函館・極寒の峡谷 復讐の影 テクモ C (暴力) 2008/11/20 サカつくDS タッチ and ダイレクト セガ A 2008/12/04 ぼくとシムのまち キングダム エレクトロニック・アーツ A 2008/12/18 テイルズ オブ ハーツ アニメムービーエディション/CGムービーエディション バンダイナムコゲームス (ナムコ) B (犯罪) 2008/12/25 ファンタシースターZERO セガ A 2009/01/29 ファイナルファンタジー・クリスタルクロニクル エコーズ・オブ・タイム スクウェア・エニックス A 2009/02/11 マリオ&ルイージRPG3!!! 任天堂 A 2009/03/12 立体ピクロス 任天堂 A 2009/03/26 メタルファイト ベイブレード ハドソン A 2009/05/30 KINGDOM HEARTS 358/2 Days スクウェア・エニックス A 2009/06/18 トモダチコレクション 任天堂 A 2009/07/11 ドラゴンクエストIX 星空の守り人 スクウェア・エニックス A 2009/07/23 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS フレイムランブルX 未来超爆発!! タカラトミー A 2009/08/27 日本経済新聞社監修 知らないままでは損をする「モノやお金のしくみ」DS 任天堂 A 2010/09/30 大神伝 ~小さき太陽~ カプコン A 2009/11/19 マリオ&ソニック AT バンクーバーオリンピック 任天堂 A 2009/12/17 家庭教師ヒットマンREBORN!DS オレがボス!最強ファミリー大戦 タカラトミー A 2009/12/23 ゼルダの伝説 大地の汽笛 任天堂 A 2010/02/18 遊戯王ファイブディーズ ワールドチャンピオンシップ2010 リバース オブ アルカディア コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A 2010/03/18 薄桜鬼DS アイディアファクトリー C (セクシャル) 2010/04/01 nicola監修 モデル☆おしゃれオーディション アルケミスト A 2010/05/27 サカつくDS ワールドチャレンジ2010 セガ A 2010/05/27 メダロットDS カブトVer./クワガタVer. ロケットカンパニー A 2010/06/24 ラブプラス+ コナミデジタルエンタテインメント C (恋愛, セクシャル) 2010/09/09 ワンピースギガントバトル! バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2010/09/18 ポケットモンスター ブラック/ホワイト ポケモン/任天堂 A 2010/10/07 KINGDOM HEARTS Re coded スクウェア・エニックス A 2010/11/11 たまごっちのなりきりチャレンジ バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2010/11/25 みんなとキミのピラメキーノ! バンダイナムコゲームス (ナムコ) A 2010/12/02 メタルファイト ベイブレード 頂上決戦!ビッグバン・ブレーダーズ ハドソン A 2011/11/17 ワンピースギガントバトル!2 新世界 バンダイナムコゲームス (バンダイ) A 2011/11/24 FabStyle コーエーテクモゲームス B (恋愛) 2010/11/11 とんがりボウシと魔法のお店 コナミデジタルエンタテインメント A
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Operation Varsity字幕和訳 ブリーフィング Null3DSubtitle Operation Varsity – March 25, 1945 バーシティ作戦 - 1945年3月25日 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00625_01 Attention, Airborne. This is Operation Varsity. We re finally dropping into Germany. Our enemy is about to collapse, but that does not mean he is weak. 注目しろ、空挺隊。これがバーシティー作戦だ。我々はついにドイツ本土に降下することになった。我々の敵はもうすぐ倒れようとしているが、それは決して奴らが弱いというわけではない。 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00626_01 Here is our DZ. Air force carpet-bombed this factory district for weeks, but months worth of war material remains undamaged. これが降下地点だ。航空部隊は工場地帯に対して1週間にも及ぶ集中爆撃を行ったが、この数ヶ月の様子を見た限りではほとんどダメージを受けていない。 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00627_01 This is a Panzer tank assembly facility. Local resistance reports a railgun is hidden inside. If you find it, you know what to do. これはドイツ軍の戦車の組み立て工場だ。地元のレジスタンスは、内部に列車砲が隠されていると報告してくれた。もし発見した場合は何をすればいいか分かっているな。 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00627_05 The enemy has several tanks ready to deliver to the front lines. Make sure they never leave this railyard. 敵は最前線に配備直前の戦車を保有している。この車両基地から出られなくしてやれ。 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00627_03 This chem plant produces explosives for anti-aircraft shells. We believe there is a large stockpile of munitions in the basement. Find it, and do away with it. この化学工場は対空砲の弾を製造している。我々は大量の軍需品の備蓄が地下にあると確信している。それを発見し、処分せよ。 CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00627_04 This is a simple mission. If it can shoot you, or be shot at you, destroy it. Dismissed. これは単純な作戦だ。もしそれが諸君に攻撃できる状態か、あるいは諸君を狙ってくる場合は、破壊しろ。では解散。 ※未使用セリフ CIUS_VAR1_DCH_00626_02 Aerial recon shows that our enemy is using railcars to haul whatever they can salvage into battle. 航空偵察隊は奴らが戦いで獲得した物資を鉄道で輸送していることを突き止めた。 C-47機内 CIUS_VAR1_LRK_09100_02 Hey! Guys! I got a good one! Whadda ya get when you cross a Nazi and a cockroach? You get-- なあ! お前達! いいことを思いついたぜ! ナチ野郎とゴキブリを混ぜ合わせたらどうなると思う? そいつは…。 CIUS_VAR1_JM_09103_01 Stand up! Hook up! 立つんだ! フックを掛けろ! CIUS_VAR1_VKR_09109_01 Go! Go! Go! Get out! Get out!! 行け! 行け! 行け! 出るんだ! 出るんだ!! ※未使用セリフ CIUS_VAR1_JM_09104_01 Check equipment! Sound off! 装備を確認しろ! 大声で言え! CIUS_VAR1_PT7_09108_01 Seven O- セブン、オ… CIUS_VAR1_TPR7_09108_02 ...ok! …オーケー! Aud_Var01_FakeWAV_CIUS_VAR1_PT10_09107_01 O--OK! Ten OK! オ…オーケー! テン、オーケー! CIUS_VAR1_PT12_09106_01 Twelve OK! トゥウェルブ、オーケー! CIUS_VAR1_PT13_09105_01 H-Hendricks is gone! Lucky thirteen OK! へ、ヘンドリクスは死んだ! ラッキーサーティーン、オーケー! 狙撃兵の始末 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09195_01 All units, we have reports of enemy snipers in the east sector of the railyard. Practice extreme caution when moving about in this area. 全部隊へ、車両基地の東地区にて敵の狙撃兵を発見した。この地域での活動では最大限の注意を払え。 AIUS_VAR1_OWD_09240_01 Watch out for snipers! 狙撃兵に注意しろ! AIUS_VAR1_OWD_09241_01 Nice shot! Keep an eye out for more of em! ナイスショット! 目を離すな、奴らはまだいるぞ! 軍需品の破壊 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09210_02 S-two has uncovered the existence of an underground munitions stockpile. Orders are to locate and destroy it. S-2が地下に隠されている軍需品を発見した。そちらに向かい、破壊せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09260_01 We re almost there, Travers! もうすぐ到着だ、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09261_01 There s our target! Get a charge on there! あれが目標だ! 爆弾を仕掛けろ! AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09261_02 Better get ready to run, Travers! しっかりと走れる用意をしろ、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09261_03 RUN! Hurry! 走れ! さっさとしろ! AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09262_01 Munitions destroyed. Good job, Travers! 軍需品を破壊した。よくやった、トラバーズ! 列車に搭載された戦車の破壊 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09205_01 Attention all Airborne. CO instructions are to find and disable any and all railcars loaded with enemy armor. 全空挺部隊に告ぐ。司令部より、敵の装甲車を搭載した列車をすべて発見し無力化せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_SKS_09242_01 Get a charge on that tank! あの戦車に爆弾を仕掛けろ! AIUS_VAR1_SKS_09243_01 Good work! There s two more! よくやった! まだ2両残ってるぞ! AIUS_VAR1_SKS_09244_01 Good one, Travers! Only one left! いいぞ、トラバーズ! あと1両だ! AIUS_VAR1_SKS_09245_01 That s all of em! Good work, Travers! これで全部だ! よくやった、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09254_01 Come on, we got more objectives! 来い、次の任務があるぞ! 列車砲の破壊 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09200_01 All units receiving this transmission, we have reports of an enemy rail-gun hidden inside the factory. Command instructions are to determine its whereabouts and eliminate its effectiveness using any and all sabotage methods. この通信範囲内の全部隊に告ぐ、工場の内部に列車砲が隠されているという報告を受けた。司令部より、その所在場所を明らかにし、実行可能なあらゆる破壊手段を用いて破壊せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09252_01 There s the rail gun! We gotta take it out! こいつが列車砲だ! 吹っ飛ばすぞ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09253_01 Great work, Travers! いい仕事っぷりだ、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09246_01 Come on, Airborne. There s more work to do! 来い、空挺隊。まだ仕事があるぞ! 工場の制御室へ SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09196_01 All units, S-two reports the tank factory remains operational. Instructions are to locate and sabotage the main control room. 全部隊に告ぐ、S-2からの報告によると戦車工場は未だに稼動中である。中央制御室に向かい破壊せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09253_02 Travers, get up to the control room! トラバーズ、制御室に行け! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09253_01(使い回し) Great work, Travers! いい仕事っぷりだ、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09246_01 Come on, Airborne. There s more work to do! 来い、空挺隊。まだ仕事があるぞ! 圧力弁の破壊 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09197_02 Attention Airborne. Updated intel indicates functional machinery near the loading dock. Orders are to locate and sabotage key pressure valves. 空挺部隊に告ぐ。最新情報によると搬入口付近に稼動中の機械がある模様だ。現地へ向かい主要圧力弁を破壊せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09255_01 Good work, Travers. There s one more! よくやった、トラバーズ。もう1つだ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09256_01 That s it! Nice job! そいつだ! よくやった! AIUS_VAR1_RDS_09263_01 Don t let up, the factory is not secure yet! 手を休めるな、工場はまだ確保していないぞ! 工場の西に集合 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09215_01 All Airborne units within range of this transmission, report to the west end of the factory sector to mobilize and await new orders. この通信範囲内の全空挺部隊に告ぐ、工場地区の西側最深部に向かって新しい命令を待ち、その任務に参加せよ。 装甲列車の登場 ムービー ICUS_VAR1_SSR_09151_01 Spread out, find cover! 散開しろ、身を隠すんだ! ICUS_VAR1_SSR_09152_01 Get ready to fire! 攻撃準備完了! ICUS_VAR1_OXN_09153_01 What is that? あれは何だ? ICGE_VAR1_BNE_09154_01 Destroy them all! まとめて叩き潰せ! 車両基地の防衛 SCUS_VAR1_WHL_09220_01 Attention all Airborne. An enemy Panzerzug has delivered troops to the railyard. Instructions are to destroy the Panzerzug and secure the railyard. 全空挺隊に告ぐ。敵の装甲列車が車両基地に増援を派遣した。装甲列車を破壊し車両基地を防衛せよ。 AIUS_VAR1_WOL_09279_01 Get on top of it! Use the catwalks! 上に行け! キャットウォークを使うんだ! AIUS_VAR1_STO_09278_01 All right, that s one down! We got two more! いいぞ、1箇所目だ! あと2箇所あるぞ! AIUS_VAR1_STO_09281_01 Good one, Travers! One more! その調子だ、トラバーズ! もう1箇所だ! AIUS_VAR1_WOL_09282_01 That s it, we did it! Great work, Travers! よし、やったぞ! よくやった、トラバーズ! ステージクリア ICUS_VAR1_CWB_09165_01 原文 Colonel Scott Webb, commanding officer. This is the after action report for Operation Varsity, March twenty-fifth, nineteen forty-five. 司令官、スコット・ウェブ大佐。これは1945年3月25日のバーシティー作戦における戦闘報告である。 ICUS_VAR1_CWB_09166_01 Landed near our designated DZ and quickly took several objectives. Destroying tanks, supplies and a massive rail-gun. 指定された降下地点の近くに降下し、迅速に目的を達成した。戦車、軍需品、そして巨大な列車砲を破壊した。 ICUS_VAR1_CWB_09167_01 Sniper fire was heavy, but was eventually overcome|by patient tactics and well-aimed counter-fire. Our company took especially high casualties after an enemy Panzerzug delivered elite troops to the fight. 激しい精密射撃を受けたが、粘り強い戦術と的確な反撃で勝利を収めることができた。しかし、敵の装甲列車が精鋭部隊を送り込んでからは我が部隊は多大な犠牲者を出す結果となった。 ICUS_VAR1_CWB_09168_01 We must win this. And win it soon. 我々は勝利しなければならない。そして、その勝利はすぐ目の前にある。 未分類 AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09253_03 Nice job, Travers! よくやった、トラバーズ! AIUS_VAR1_SHP_09270_01 Factory is secure! Come on, Travers, we gotta assemble with the others! 工場を確保! 来るんだ、トラバーズ、他の連中と合流するぞ! AIUS_VAR1_WOL_09280_01 Drop a grenade in there, Travers! ここに手榴弾を投下しろ、トラバーズ! ICUS_VAR1_SSR_09150_01 We got incoming! Everybody on me! 到着した! お前達付いて来い! コメント スパム対策につき閉鎖中
https://w.atwiki.jp/takemi201/pages/29.html
今週大なわれるニューヨーク国際オートショーにTransitionという車が出品されるそうです。 TransitionはアメリカのTerrafugia社が開発した「合法的に公道を走れる飛行機」というもので、折りたたみ可能な翼と四つの車輪がついた二人乗り飛行機だそうです。 飛行機というだけあってもちろん空も飛べますが、自動車として走ることもできるという自動車とも飛行機ともいえる車ですが、日本で実用化するのはちょっと難しそうですね。 宮原もとみ 逆流性食道炎克服プログラムhttp //highfidelitie.com/ 引っ越し 準備 引っ越し費用